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(57) ABSTRACT 
A structure intrusion may be determined. For example, a 
signal may be received corresponding to a wave propagating 
in the structure. Next, the received signal may be analyzed. 
Based on the analysis in a "passive mode", a breach may be 
determined to have occurred in the structure when the 
received signal indicates that at least one aspect of the 
received signal crosses a predetermined threshold. Further-
more, based on the analysis in an "active mode", a breach may 
be determined to have occurred in the structure when com-
paring the received signal to a baseline waveform indicates 
that at least one aspect of the received signal varies from the 
baseline waveform by a predetermined amount. The wave 
propagating in the structure may comprise an elastic wave 
and may be in an acoustic frequency range or in an ultrasonic 
frequency range. 
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1 
DETERMINING ENCLOSURE BREACH 
ULTRASONICALLY 
RELATED APPLICATIONS 
2 
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a container; 
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a processor; 
FIG. 4 is a flow chart ofa method for determining enclosure 
intrusions and other enclosure information; 
FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an ultrasonic breach detec-
tion subsystem; 
FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an ultrasonic sensor; 
Related U.S. patent application Ser. No. 12/523,611, filed 
on even date herewith in the name of Georgia Tech Research 
Corporation et al. and entitled "ENCLOSURE DOOR STA-
TUS DETECTION," related U.S. patent application Ser. No. 
12/523,614, filed on even date herewith in the name of Geor-
gia Tech Research Corporation et al. and entitled "DETER-
MINING ENCLOSURE BREACH ELECTROMECHANI-
CALLY," each being assigned to the assignee of the present 
application, are hereby incorporated by reference. 
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating an electromagnetic trans-
mission line (EMTL) sensor; 
1° FIG. 8 is a diagram illustrating an electromagnetic trans-
mission line (EMTL) sensor; 
FIG. 9 is a diagram illustrating an EMTL subsystem; 
FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating a container movement 
15 detection subsystem; 
BACKGROUND 
Threats due to terrorism come in many forms. In some 
situations, containers carrying goods into a country may be 
tampered with or contain unauthorized or harmful material. 20 
For example, a container carrying commercial goods from 
one country to another may be tampered with during trans-
portation to insert harmful material. Vulnerability to tamper-
ing is a shortcoming in conventional container security 
devices. Current container security technologies provide only 25 
limited protection from various threats to shipping. Particu-
larly, conventional container security devices fail to account 
for the threat posed by motivated actors, including, for 
example, terrorist groups. For example, conventional strate-
gies do not address a broad risk spectrum with a focus on 30 
those risks that threaten national security. Moreover, conven-
tional strategies do not provide a number of tamper-resistant 
features incorporated into one design. In other words, con-
ventional strategies do not address vulnerability to even sim-
plistic tampering methods. 35 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
Consistent with embodiments of the present invention, sys-
tems and methods are disclosed for determining structure 40 
intrusions. For example, a signal may be received corre-
sponding to a wave propagating in the structure. Next, the 
received signal may be analyzed. Based on the analysis in a 
"passive mode", a breach may be determined to have 
occurred in the structure when the received signal indicates 45 
that at least one aspect of the received signal crosses a prede-
termined threshold. Furthermore, based on the analysis in an 
"active mode", a breach may be determined to have occurred 
in the structure when comparing the received signal to a 
baseline waveform indicates that at least one aspect of the 50 
received signal varies from the baseline waveform by a pre-
determined amount. 
It is to be understood that both the foregoing general 
description and the following detailed description are 
examples and explanatory only, and should not be considered 55 
to restrict the invention's scope, as described and claimed. 
Further, features and/or variations may be provided in addi-
tion to those set forth herein. For example, embodiments of 
the invention may be directed to various feature combinations 
and sub-combinations described in the detailed description. 60 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FIG. 11 is a flow chart of a method for container movement 
detection; 
FIG. 12 is a diagram illustrating infrared radiation absorp-
tion; 
FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating a human detection sub-
system; 
FIG. 14 is a graph illustrating a calculated 10 cm path 
transmission for 4.3 µm C02 absorption band; 
FIG. 15 is a flowchart of a method for detecting humans in 
an enclosure; 
FIG. 16 is a diagram illustrating a door status subsystem; 
FIG. 17 is a diagram illustrating a light control film coat-
ing; 
FIG. 18 is a flow chart of a method for operating a door 
status sensor; 
FIG. 19 is a diagram illustrating sensor fusion; and 
FIG. 20 is a diagram illustrating sensor fusion. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The following detailed description refers to the accompa-
nying drawings. Wherever possible, the same reference num-
bers are used in the drawings and the following description to 
refer to the same or similar elements. While embodiments of 
the invention may be described, modifications, adaptations, 
and other implementations are possible. For example, substi-
tutions, additions, or modifications may be made to the ele-
ments illustrated in the drawings, and the methods described 
herein may be modified by substituting, reordering, or adding 
stages to the disclosed methods. Accordingly, the following 
detailed description does not limit the invention. Instead, the 
invention's proper scope is defined by the appended claims. 
Enclosure intrusions and other enclosure information may 
be determined consistent with embodiments of the present 
invention. For example, a multi-modal sensing device may be 
provided to secure containers (e.g. shipping containers) 
against various threats. These threats may comprise, but are 
not limited to, structural breaches, a locked door opening, and 
human presence. Moreover, embodiments of the invention 
may incorporate an integrated design including multiple 
sensing modalities, sensor fusion algorithms, and associated 
packaging. Embodiments of the invention may be performed 
by any one or more subsystems that are described in more 
detail below. 
By way of a non-limiting example, FIG. 1 illustrates a 
security system 100 in which features and principles of the 
present invention may be implemented. As illustrated in the 
block diagram of FIG. 1, system 100 may include a container 
105, a network 110, and a processor 115. Container 105 may The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in 
and constitute a part of this disclosure, illustrate various 
embodiments of the present invention. In the drawings: 
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an operating environment; 
65 include sensors 120. A controller 125 may also be included in 
container 105 to coordinate communications between sen-
sors 120 and processor 115. 
US 8,406,082 B2 
3 
Processor 115 may be monitored or operated by a user, for 
example, desiring to implement container security. Further-
more, the user may also be an organization, enterprise, or any 
other entity having such desires. Container 105 may com-
prise, but is not limited to, a shipping container configured to 
be used for transporting goods from one location to another. 
For example, container 105 may be filled with goods, 
secured, and placed upon a ship, airplane, or truck to be 
transported. While container 105 may comprise a shipping 
container, it may comprise, for example, any enclosure for 10 
which location, movement, security, structural breaches, door 
position status, or human presence may be monitored. As will 
be described in greater detail below, data gathered by sensors 
120 may be sent to processor 115 over network 110. While 
system 100 illustrates only one container 105, a plurality of 15 
containers my be monitored by processor 115. FIG. 2 shows 
container 105 in more detail. 
4 
time-frequency domain may be used to separate noise signals 
generated by breaches from non-breaching noise events. In 
the time-frequency domain, for example, a wavelet trans-
form, a chirp let transform, or other similar transforms may be 
used. 
Moreover, the ultrasonic sensors may operate actively by 
transmitting a signal (e.g. a pulse elastic wave) into the wall 
and then comparing the response due to the transmitted signal 
with a response from previously transmitted signals. Further-
more, the signal may be transmitted in the floor, roof, or in any 
other part of container 105 in which the signal may be trans-
mitted and is not limited to the walls. Changes in the ultra-
sonic response to container 105's walls, for example, may 
indicate a new breach and may generate an alarm by proces-
sor 115 or controller 125. In other words, active operation 
may involve transmitting and receiving signals comprising 
ultrasonic waves in container 105's walls using various sen-
sor (i.e. transducer) pairs that may be attached to the wall. 
Ultrasonic elastic waves are examples and the signals propa-
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, system 100 
may provide container security with multiple sensing modali-
ties, condition monitoring, and advanced alerting capabili-
ties. System 100 may incorporate a number of sensors 120 as 
well as sensor fusion technologies that may address a variety 
20 gated into the walls may comprise other signal types. One 
transducer may be operated as a transmitter and another one 
of threats to the container. Specific threats that may be 
detected include, for example, container 105 structure 
breaches, presence of unauthorized occupants (e.g. humans) 25 
in container 105, container 105 door opening, and environ-
mental conditions associated with container 105. In addition, 
container 105's movement may be monitored along with the 
temperature and humidity inside container 105. Information 
collected by sensors 120 may be processed by processor 115. 30 
Processor 115 or controller 125 may determine whether a 
security violation has occurred with container 105 and issues 
an alert. 
as a receiver. 
The ultrasonic waves generated by the transmitter may be 
recorded by the receiver. This process may be repeated for 
multiple transmit/receive transducer combinations. For each 
transmit/receive event, ultrasonic waves propagate through-
out container 105's walls and interact with boundaries, natu-
ral structural variations, and breaches. Received ultrasonic 
wave signals may contain information about the material/ 
structure between and in the vicinity of the particular trans-
mit/receive transducer pair used for the active ultrasonic mea-
surement. In the active mode, received ultrasonic waveforms 
may be analyzed and compared to baseline waveforms (e.g. 
waveforms recorded before a breach existed.) Features com-
35 puted from both passive and active ultrasonic signals may be 
computed and analyzed, for example, by processor 115 or 
controller 125 as a function of time to detect and characterize 
potential breaches. 
Various communications interfaces may be used to provide 
remote access in system 100. A local communications inter-
face (e.g. located in controller 125) may provide wireless 
communication between processor 115 and sensors 120 
within 50 meters of container 105 using, for example, the 
IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. This protocol may be sufficiently 
robust to enable, for example, 50 meter transmission dis- 40 
tances even when a transmitter associated with any of sensors 
120 is surrounded by other containers that may obstruct radio 
transmissions using other protocols. The local communica-
tions interface may enable users with handheld computing 
devices (e.g. personal digital assistants (PDA)) to query con- 45 
tainer 105 or receive security alerts from container 105. Long 
distance communication may be accomplished between pro-
cessor 115 and sensors 120 via an RS-485 interface (e.g. 
located in controller 125) to a marine asset tagging and track-
ing system (MATTS). A physical interface (e.g. a cable) may 50 
also be provided between processor 115 and controller 125 
associated with sensors 120 to allow firmware upgrades to be 
loaded directly onto controller 125. 
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, container 
105 breach detection may be accomplished, for example, via 55 
ultrasonic sensors and electromagnetic sensors included in 
sensors 120. These sensors may detect changes in the con-
tainer structure. The ultrasonic sensors may be installed as a 
sparse array mounted to container 105' s walls. The ultrasonic 
sensors may operate passively or actively. For example, the 60 
ultrasonic sensors may operate passively by listening for elas-
tic waves in container 105's walls that may indicate an 
attempt to cut into the container. For passive operation, one or 
more sensors on each wall may be used as ultrasonic receivers 
to detect signals corresponding to "ultrasonic events" (e.g. 65 
elastic waves in container 105's walls.) The nature of these 
signals in the time-domain, the frequency domain, or the 
All sensors 120 may be integrated into a single monitoring 
system. As described in greater detail below, data fusion 
algorithms may be used to detect, locate, and estimate the 
severity of a breach or potential breach. The combination of 
the passive and active ultrasonic monitoring processes may 
provide a robust detection method for breach detection. 
Although shipping containers may be referenced above, 
embodiments of the invention may be applied to any enclo-
sure. 
To detect breaches in portions of container 105 made of a 
material for which the aforementioned ultrasonic sensors 
may not be able to detect a breach, electromagnetic sensors 
may be used. For example, container 105's floor may be 
wooden or any material not as well suited for the aforemen-
tioned ultrasonic sensors. Consequently, the aforementioned 
ultrasonic sensors may not be able to detect a breach in 
container 105's floor. The electromagnetic sensors, for 
example, may each comprise paired transmission lines that 
may be placed in container 105's floor. A radio frequency 
(RF) signal with a known frequency may be applied to these 
paired transmission lines in order to generate a standing wave 
pattern. As described in greater detail below, the standing 
wave pattern can be monitored by controller 125 or processor 
115 to detect floor breaches in container 105. Furthermore, 
the frequency used by the electromagnetic sensors may be 
generated pseudo-randomly that may make the sensor diffi-
cult to tamper. 
A breach may be defined, for example, as any intrusion 
attempt that produces a hole nine square inches or larger in 
US 8,406,082 B2 
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area through a side of a container. Moreover, breaches may be 
detected with a detection probability greater than 75% and 
within two minutes of occurrence. Any corresponding false 
alarm rate may be less than 0.003 false alarms per container 
trip. Any of sensors 120 may be suitable for installation in 
both new containers and used containers in less than two 
hours in order to accommodate widespread deployment. 
Because of the unique threats posed to the floor, a sensor used 
for the floor may be insensitive to nails driven through the 
floor for securing cargo, floor damage associated with normal 
use, and cargo loading conditions. The maritime environment 
may require that the sensor be insensitive to both humidity in 
the container and floor moisture content. 
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, electro-
magnetic sensors (i.e. electromagnetic transmission line 
(EMTL) sensors) may comprise a grid of parallel conductive 
strips that are installed on the floor between two plywood 
sections in order to form an electromagnetic transmission 
line. The spacing of the conductors and the construction of the 
grid may be such that driving nails through the floor and other 
damage associated with normal use may not significantly 
alter (either by breaking or shorting) conductors in the grid. 
However, cutting a hole with an area (e.g. greater than nine 
square inches) may break the grid and thus change the trans-
mission line's characteristics. 
These changes in the transmission line's characteristics 
may be detected by measuring the voltage standing wave 
pattern on the transmission line. A standing wave pattern may 
be induced on a transmission line when the transmission line 
6 
optical sensors that may comprise two parts: an LED light 
source; and a paired photodetector that may be sensitive to 
light from the LED light source. One part may be installed 
inside container 105 on a wall and the other part may be 
installed on container 105's door panel. The two parts may 
operate such that the light from the LED light source may be 
incident on the photodetector when the door is closed. A light 
control film may be used to limit the photodetector's field of 
view so that small changes in the door position can be 
10 detected. 
A door opening event may be detected when the change in 
light level at the photodetector exceeds a threshold value. In 
other words, if container 105's door were to open a small 
15 amount, no door opening event may be detected. However, if 
container 105's door were to open so much as to change the 
light level at the photodetector to exceed the threshold value, 
a door opening event may be detected. For example, small 
changes in the door's location may not indicate that the door 
20 is being opened. If, however, the door were to move by a 
larger amount, this may indicate that the door is being opened. 
In the shipping container example, containers may be 
stacked, that in turn, may cause the doors on some containers 
to bulge open a small amount. Because this bulging may be a 
25 common occurrence and may not indicate tampering, a door 
opening event may not be indicated by door bulging due to 
stacking. Moreover, using randomly generated pulse codes 
between the LED light source and the paired photodetector to 
interrogate the open door sensor may make it more difficult to 
30 tamper. These codes may be generated pseudorandomly so 
that the transmitter and receiver may synchronize without a 
cabled connection between them. 
is driven at a constant frequency. Reflections may occur at the 
line termination. This pattern may be characterized by the 
location of the maximum and minimum voltage points, the 
separation between those points, and the ratio of the maxi-
mum to minimum voltage values, that is referred to as the 
voltage standing wave ratio (VSWR). These transmission line 35 
characteristics may be measured by sensing the voltage on the 
line at several locations along the grid at several different 
input frequencies. These frequencies may be applied as short 
RF bursts in the frequency range, for example, from 1 MHz to 
As stated above, the door sensor may comprise two parts 
(i.e. two modules). One part may include an LED that emits 
light of wavelength 950 nm in a narrow beam with a diver-
gence of less than 10 degrees. The other part may include a 
low profile silicon photodetector with a sheet oflight control 
film covering the detector. The light control film may com-
prise, but is not limited to, a modified implementation of the 
embedded-micro-louver transparent plastic sheets used, for 
example, to cover computer display terminals and provide 
50 MHz. The duty cycle for the signal generation may be 40 
estimated to be less than 0.001 % to meet a 2 minute breach 
detection goal. The aforementioned EMTL process may be 
effective for detecting breaches while unaffected by either 
nailing through, for example, the floor or cargo loading 
effects. Furthermore, sensor operation may be maintained 
after both shorting or breaking grid lines. Although developed 
for shipping containers, this concept may be applied as a 
process for detecting penetration of other enclosures. 
Sensors 120 may also include carbon dioxide (C02 ) pres-
ence sensors. For example, human presence may be detected 
using the C02 sensor. The C02 concentration in container 
105, for example, may increase in a closed system such as 
container 105 when a human is present. The C02 sensor may 
comprise two light emitting diodes (LEDs), one LED may 
emit light in a small spectral region where C02 displays 
strong absorption and the other LED may emit light in spec-
tral region where C02 displays no absorption. By pulsing 
these LEDs in sequence and monitoring the light transmis-
sion through a cavity that contains an air sample from con-
tainer 105, the C02 concentration in container 105 may be 
calculated. Because the rate at which carbon dioxide concen-
tration increases with human presence may be pre-estab-
lished, comparing C02 concentrations from container 105 
with these pre-established measurements may indicate 
whether a human is present in container 105. 
Furthermore, sensors 120 may also include an open door 
sensor. The container door status may be monitored using 
privacy in public environments. 
For the door sensor application, the aforementioned film 
may be fabricated such that it may restrict light transmission 
45 to an angle less than 10 degrees. The two door sensor modules 
may be installed so that, when the door is closed, light from 
the LED may be incident upon and detected by the photode-
tector. For example, as the door is opened, the interior angle 
increases. Consequently, the light amount detected decreases 
50 as the light beam rotates out of the detector's field of view 
which may be defined by the light control film. A detection 
threshold for the photodetector may be used to define when 
the door is considered opened. Furthermore, instead of con-
tinuous illumination, the light from the LED may be pulsed 
55 using a pulse interval modulation signaling scheme. This may 
prevent active falsification of the LED source's signature for 
the purposes of generating a false "door closed" status. 
Moreover, sensors 120 may also include a movement sen-
sor. Container 105's movement sensor may comprise, for 
60 example, a dual-axis, low power accelerometer. The acceler-
ometer may senses changes in velocity along each axis. This 
velocity change data may then be integrated in order to find 
container 105's velocity. For example, a non-zero velocity 
may indicate that container 105 is in motion. Furthermore, 
65 sensors 120 may also include sensors to monitor environmen-
tal conditions inside container 105 such as temperature and 
humidity. 
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Data from sensors 120 may be transmitted to controller 125 
that may in tum process and transmit the data over network 
110 to processor 115. Processor 115 may process the data 
prior to making a decision to issue a security alert. In another 
embodiment, controller 125 may process the data prior to 
making a decision to issue a security alert and pass any alerts 
8 
ing environments where tasks are performed by remote pro-
cessing devices. Furthermore, any of the processors may 
comprise a mobile terminal, such as a smart phone, a cellular 
telephone, a cellular telephone utilizing wireless application 
protocol (WAP), personal digital assistant (PDA), intelligent 
pager, portable computer, a hand held computer, a conven-
tional telephone, or a facsimile machine. The aforementioned 
systems and devices are exemplary and the processors may 
comprise other systems or devices. 
Network 110 may comprise, for example, a local area 
network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN). Such net-
working environments may be used in offices, enterprise-
wide computer networks, intranets, and the Internet. When a 
LAN is used as network 110, a network interface located at 
to processor 115. This integrated approach to detecting secu-
rity threats may improve a high security threat detection 
probability to container 105 while minimizing false alarms 
risks. Moreover, techniques to improve sensor 120's tamper- 10 
resistance may be incorporated into sensors 120 as well as 
into controller 125. In addition, system 100 may interface to 
other sensors that can provide utility to shippers. These other 
sensors may comprise, but are not limited to, radio frequency 
identification (RFID) tag readers. The ability to read RFID 
tags on goods or other elements as they enter or exit container 
105 may comprise a significant asset. For example, controller 
125 or processor 115 may monitor and record all goods or 
other elements that have entered and exited container 105. 
15 any of the processors may be used to interconnect any of the 
processors. When network 110 is implemented in a WAN 
networking environment, such as the Internet, the processors 
may typically include an internal or external modem (not 
shown) or other elements for establishing communications 
20 over the WAN. Further, in utilizing network 110, data sent 
over network 110 may be encrypted to insure data security by 
using encryption/decryption techniques. 
An embodiment consistent with the invention may com-
prise a system for determining enclosure intrusions and other 
enclosure information. The system may comprise a memory 
storage and a processing unit coupled to the memory storage. 
The processing unit may be operative to receive data from a 
plurality of sensors associated with the enclosure wherein at 
least one of the plurality of sensors comprises at least one of 
the following sensor types: ultrasonic, acoustic, electromag-
netic transmission line (EMTL ), container movement, human 
detection, and door status. Furthermore, the processing unit 
may be operative to analyze the data to determine if an enclo- 30 
sure intrusion event has occurred. In addition, the processing 
unit may be operative to issue an alert when it is determined 
that the intrusion event has occurred. 
Consistent with an embodiment of the present invention, 
the aforementioned memory, processing unit, and other com-
ponents may be implemented in a security system, such 
exemplary security system 100 ofFIGS.1and2. Any suitable 
combination of hardware, software, and/or firmware may be 
used to implement the memory, processing unit, or other 
components. By way of example, the memory, processing 
unit, or other components may be implemented with any of 
processor 115 or controller 125, in combination with system 
100. The aforementioned system, processor, and controller 
are exemplary and other systems, processors, and controllers 
may comprise the aforementioned memory, processing unit, 
or other components, consistent with embodiments of the 
present invention. 
FIG. 3 shows processor 115 of FIG. 1 in more detail. As 
shown in FIG. 3, processor 115 may include a processing unit 
325 and a memory 330. Memory 330 may include a software 
module 335 and a database 340. While executing on process-
ing unit 325, software module 335 may perform security 
processes, including, for example, one or more of the stages 
In addition to utilizing a wire line communications system 
as network 110, a wireless communications system, or a 
25 combination of wire line and wireless may be utilized as 
network 110 in order to, for example, exchange web pages via 
the Internet, exchange e-mails via the Internet, or for utilizing 
other communications channels. Wireless can be defined as 
radio transmission via the airwaves. However, various other 
communication techniques can be used to provide wireless 
transmission, including infrared line-of-sight, cellular, 
microwave, satellite, packet radio, and spread spectrum radio. 
The processors in the wireless environment can be any mobile 
terminal, such as the mobile terminals described above. Wire-
35 less data may include, but is not limited to, paging, text 
messaging, e-mail, Internet access and other specialized data 
applications specifically excluding or including voice trans-
mission. For example, the processors may communicate 
across a wireless interface such as, for example, a cellular 
40 interface (e.g. general packet radio system (GPRS), enhanced 
data rates for global evolution (EDGE), global system for 
mobile communications (GSM)), a wireless local area net-
work interface (e.g., WLAN, IEEE 802, WiFi, WiMax), a 
bluetooth interface, another RF communication interface, 
45 and/or an optical interface. 
System 100 may also transmit data by methods and pro-
cesses other than, or in combination with, network 110. These 
methods and processes may include, but are not limited to, 
transferring data via, diskette, flash memory sticks, CD/DVD 
50 ROM, facsimile, conventional mail, an interactive voice 
response system (IVR), or via voice over a publicly switched 
telephone network. 
of method 400 described below with respect to FIG. 4. Fur-
thermore, any combination of software module 335 and data- 55 
base 340 may also be executed on or reside in controller 125 
FIG. 4 is a flow chart setting forth the general stages 
involved in a method 400 consistent with an embodiment of 
the invention for determining enclosure intrusions and other 
enclosure information. Method 400 may be implemented 
using processor 115 or controller 125 as described in more 
detail below with respect to FIG. 1. Ways to implement the 
stages of method 400 will be described in greater detail below. 
as shown in FIG. 1. Controller 125 may comprise a configu-
ration similar to processor 115. 
Processor 115 or controller 125 ("the processors") 
included in system 100 may be implemented using a personal 60 
computer, network computer, mainframe, or other similar 
microcomputer-based workstation. The processors may 
though comprise any type of computer operating environ-
ment, such as hand-held devices, multiprocessor systems, 
microprocessor-based or programmable sender electronic 65 
devices, minicomputers, mainframe computers, and the like. 
The processors may also be practiced in distributed comput-
Method 400 may begin at starting block 405 and proceed to 
stage 410 where controller 125 may receive data from plural-
ity of sensors 120 located within an enclosure (e.g. container 
105.) For example, at least one of the plurality of sensors may 
comprise at least one of the following sensor types: ultra-
sonic, acoustic, electromagnetic transmission line (EMTL), 
container movement, human detection, and door status, as 
described, for example, in more detail below. 
US 8,406,082 B2 
9 10 
From stage 410, where controller 125 receive the data from 
plurality of sensors 120 located within the enclosure, method 
400 may advance to stage 420 where controller 125 may 
analyze the data to determine if an enclosure intrusion event 
has occurred. For example, analyzing the data may include 
determining if the enclosure intrusion event comprises at least 
one of the following: the enclosure has been breached, any 
one of the plurality of sensors has been tampered, and the 
presence of a human has been detected in the enclosure. 
Furthermore, sensor fusion may be used, as described in more 10 
detail below, to analyze the data. 
1 t+I R~y(r, t) = T L:r 2 x(s)w(s - t)y(s + r)w(s + r - t) ds 
2 
R~y(T, t) 
t) = ---r===== ~ R~(O, t)Rry(O, t) 
=Local Temporal Coherence 
Cxy(t) = m,axly~y(r, t)I 
= Peak Coherence 
Once controller 125 analyzes the data to determine if the 
enclosure intrusion event has occurred in stage 420, method 
400 may continue to stage 430 where controller 125 may 15 
issue an alert when it is determined that the intrusion event has Here the parameter P, which may be calculated from the local 
temporal coherence, may be used to evaluate changes 
between two signals and thus may detect a breach. 
occurred. For example, issuing the alert may comprise issuing 
the alert indicating that contents of the enclosure and location 
of the enclosure. The contents of the enclosure may be deter-
mined from radio frequency identification (MD) tags placed 
on the contents of the enclosure. Moreover, the location of the 
enclosure may be determined by a movement sensor located 
An ultrasonic breach detection subsystem 500, shown in 
20 FIG. 5, comprises a digital signal processing (DSP) controller 
505, an acquisition path for acquiring passive ultrasonic data, 
an acquisition path for acquiring active ultrasonic data, and 
communication links with controller 125. Ultrasonic breach in the enclosure as described below. After controller 125 
issues the alert in stage 430, method 400 may then end at stage 
«O. ~ 
detection subsystem 500 may have three operation modes to 
reduce power consumption: (1) a sleep mode where the entire 
subsystem may be placed in a near zero power state; (2) a 
Ultrasonic Breach Detection 
Ultrasonic sensors within sensors 120 may be operated as 
an ultrasonic breach detection subsystem. The ultrasonic 
breach detection subsystem may comprise, as referenced 
above, active, passive, and/or a combination of active and 
passive ultrasonics using the same ultrasonic sensors set. 
Multiple ultrasonic sensors may be mounted on each con-
tainer surface. In the passive mode, each sensor may indepen-
dently monitor, for example, ultrasonic signals between 
approximately 50 kHz and 500 kHz. These signals may be 
analyzed by controller 125 or processor 115, for example, in 
the frequency domain in terms of ratios of energies in differ-
ent frequency bands. Each of these ratios, for example, may 
be referred to as a feature, and may be defined as follows: 
lh X2(f)df 
Feature(fi, f2, f3, f4) = 10log10 -1~1----J,!4 X2(J)df h 
Here f1 , f2 , f3 and f4 may delineate the frequency ranges of 
interest. Multiple features can be fused in order to discrimi-
nate breaching sounds from benign (i.e. non-breaching) 
sounds. In addition, these signals may be analyzed by con-
troller 125 or processor 115 in, for example, the time or the 
time-frequency domain. 
In the active mode, ultrasonic sensors may operate, for 
example, in transmit-receive pairs where the received signal 
interrogates the container surface for evidence of a breach. 
Signals may be compared to baselines, both fixed and adap-
tive, to detect changes that may be indicative of a breach. 
These signals, for example, may be analyzed by controller 
125 or processor 115 in the frequency, time, or the time-
frequency domain in the active mode. In the time domain, the 
local temporal coherence (also referred to as the local nor-
malized cross correlation) may be one measure of change that 
is sensitive to changes in wave shape but not arrival times; it 
may be given in the equations below: 
minimal power state where only the passive ultrasonic func-
tions may be operational; and (3) a higher power state during 
active ultrasonic interrogations. Ultrasonic breach detection 
30 subsystem 500 may be located on a printed circuit board in a 
main electronics enclosure except for ultrasonic sensors 510 
shown in greater detail in FIG. 6. Each of ultrasonic sensors 
510 may comprise an active piezoelectric element 605 com-
bined with sensor electronic components that may be inte-
35 grated into a small molded case. The sensor electronic com-
ponents may include a miniaturized pulser and a receive 
amplifier 615 for both passive and active operation. The 
design may incorporate sending power and signals over three 
40 lines that are shown interfaced to ultrasonic sensor 510 in 
FIG. 6. 
For passive operation, power may be provided to the lower 
left line in FIG. 6 to energize only the passive receive ampli-
fier, for example. Passive ultrasonic signals may be transmit-
45 ted back to a bank of frequency filters/sample and hold com-
parators 515 on ultrasonic breach detection subsystem 500 
shown in FIG. 5. As an option, DSP 505 may next energize the 
other two lines to the left of FIG. 6 and use the active ultra-
sonic data path to digitize passive ultrasonic signals should 
50 more complex signal features be required. 
For active operation, power may be blocked to the passive 
ultrasonic electronics (lower line to left of FIG. 6) and sup-
plied to the two lines (upper two lines to left of FIG. 6) that 
may energize and provide control signals to the active ultra-
55 sonic pulser 610 and receiver 615. The active electronics 
circuitry for each sensor 510 may be configured, for example, 
as either a pulser only, pulser/receiver, or receiver only. For 
normal active ultrasonic operation, each sensor 510 may be 
60 configured as either a pulser or a receiver. The pulser/receiver (pulse/echo) mode of operation may be retained to assist with 
sensor subsystem diagnostics and possible use of the system 
in a degraded mode of operation with only one sensor. 
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, between 4 
65 and 8 ultrasonic sensors may be integrated together in pre-
fabricated, molded cable assemblies, with transducer and 
electronic elements packaged as molded "button" shaped 
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elements at cable branch and sensor attachments points. The 
cables may be enclosed in a rubber sheathed armored cable 
harness. 
Electromagnetic Breach Detection 
The aforementioned ultrasonic breach detection may not 
be effective on container floors that are made of, for example, 
non-metal such as plywood because ultrasonic waves may not 
propagate well in non-metal (e.g. wooden) material. In addi-
tion, the floor may be subject to additional normal and abnor-
mal threats, such as penetrations from nails used to secure 10 
cargo that do not occur on other surfaces such as the walls or 
roof. As a result, consistent with embodiments of the inven-
tion, an electromagnetic transmission line (EMTL) process 
may be used on container 105' s floor. The EMTL process may 
be used on any material in which ultrasonic waves may not 15 
propagate well. 
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, breaches 
greater than nine square inches in area may be detected with 
a probability of detection greater than 82% and within two 
minutes of occurrence. The corresponding false alarm rate 20 
may be less than 0.003 false alarms per trip. The EMTL 
sensor may be suitable for installation in both new containers 
and used containers in less than two hours in order to, for 
example, accommodate widespread deployment. Because of 
the unique threats posed to the floor, the EMTL sensor may be 25 
made insensitive to nails driven through the floor for securing 
cargo, floor damage associated with normal use, and cargo 
loading conditions. The maritime environment may require 
that the sensor be insensitive to both humidity in the container 
and the moisture content of the floor. Overall average power 30 
consumption may be less than 70 mW. 
The EMTL sensor may comprise a grid of parallel conduc-
tive strips that may be installed on container 105's floor 
sandwiched between two plywood sections to form an elec-
tromagnetic transmission line. The spacing of the conductors 35 
and the construction of the grid may be such that driving nails 
through the floor and other damage associated with normal 
use may not significantly alter (e.g. either by breaking or 
shorting) the conductors in the grid. However, cutting a hole, 
for example, with an area greater than nine square inches may 40 
break the grid and thus change the transmission line's char-
acteristics. These changes can be detected by measuring the 
voltage standing wave pattern on the transmission line. A 
standing wave pattern may be induced on a transmission line 
when it is driven at a constant frequency and reflections may 45 
occur at the transmission line termination. This pattern may 
be characterized by the location of the maximum and mini-
mum voltage points, the separation between those points, and 
the ratio of the maximum to minimum voltage values, which 
is referred to as the VSWR. These transmission characteris- 50 
tics can be measured by sensing the voltage on the transmis-
sion line at several locations along the grid at several different 
frequencies. These frequencies may be applied as short RF 
bursts in the frequency range from 1 MHz to 50 MHz as 
shown in FIG. 7. The duty cycle for the signal generation may 55 
be approximately 0.001 %. Consequently, the time averaged 
power consumption for this example may be less than 500 µ W 
for a fully instrumented floor in a 40 foot container, for 
example. 
Each EMTL sensor interrogation may use several prede- 60 
termined frequencies chosen at random from an internal data-
base. Controller 125 may query the peak detectors and com-
pare values with appropriate thresholds for each frequency. 
When differences are detected that might indicate a potential 
breach, additional frequencies may be generated to com- 65 
pletely characterize the grid. This pattern may be compared to 
previously stored data to determine if a breach has occurred. 
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A rate of change algorithm may be used to add robustness to 
this detection process. If the results indicate that a breach has 
occurred, then an alarm condition may be generated along 
with a confidence level for that alert. The aforementioned 
analysis may be performed by controller 125, processor 115, 
or any element capable of performing this function. 
The design for the EMTL subsystem is illustrated in FIG. 8. 
A gated frequency generator 805 may be used to create the RF 
signals that drive transmission lines in an EMTL grid 810. 
EMTL grid 810 may comprise parallel conductors (e.g. trans-
mission lines) that may be spaced such that EMTL grid 810 
may satisfy, for example, the aforementioned nine square 
inch breach detection goal while minimizing false alarms. 
The nine square inch breach detection goal is an example and 
other goals may be used. Multiple voltage sensing amplifiers 
815 with peak detectors 820 may be used to measure the 
voltage, for example, on EMTL grid 180 at various points of 
the floor. These measurements may be processed by proces-
sor 115, controller 125, or an EMTL controller 825 that may 
contain memory to store previous grid interrogations. 
A hardware block diagram that illustrates an example hard-
ware design for an EMTL subsystem 900 is shown in FIG. 9. 
For example, after each interrogation frequency is selected by 
controller 905, a short waveform of that frequency may be 
generated and stored in a FIFO component 910. Once the 
complete waveform has been stored in FIFO component 910, 
it may be converted into an analog signal by a digital to analog 
converter 915 and coupled into a transmission line grid 920. 
Various points on transmission line grid 920 may be con-
nected to a switching matrix 925 that can cycle through each 
measurement point. The signal from each selected point may 
be passed through a frequency gated amplifier 930 that may 
amplify the signal of interest and blocks out of band noise. A 
sample and hold circuit 935 may be used to accumulate the 
output from frequency gated amplifier 930 until the wave-
form has been completely transmitted. That circuit may be 
connected to an analog to digital (AID) converter 940 that 
may digitize the value of the stored signal from sample and 
hold circuit 935 and passes it to controller 905. Controller 905 
may compare that result to the values from previous measure-
ments at the same frequency to determine whether a breach 
has occurred. 
Container Movement Detection 
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, the detec-
tion of any movement of container 105, whether the move-
ment is, for example, via rail, ship, or truck, may be achieved 
by continuously monitoring the horizontal speed of container 
105. For example, processor 115 or controller 125 may record 
changes in container 105's movement status where a thresh-
old speed (e.g. 1 mi/hr) may determine if container 105 is 
moving or not. 
Speed may be measured, for example, by making surrogate 
measurements of either distance or acceleration and then 
differentiating or integrating, respectively, those values rela-
tive to time. For example, acceleration values may be used to 
calculate speed. Two accelerometers may be oriented such 
that their axes of detection are orthogonal to each other and 
horizontal to the ground. The two measured acceleration 
components may be integrated with respect to time and the 
resulting velocity components may be root-sum-squared to 
obtain the speed. Accelerometers used, for example, may 
have a measurement range of ±2 g and frequency bandwidths 
of 50-60 Hz. Consistent with embodiments of the invention, 
where power consumption may be critical, surface micro-
machined capacitive accelerometers may provide the lowest 
power consumption while satisfying any measurement 
requirements. 
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Velocity sensors based on accelerometers may suffer from 
velocity drift errors, the magnitude of which may increase 
over time. This drift may be caused by zero-g bias errors that 
may be temperature dependent. The amount of error may vary 
from one accelerometer to another. Consequently, accelerom-
eters used for inertial navigation may be used as temporary 
backups to some other more accurate sensors such as those 
that use the global positioning system (GPS) that may be less 
prone to measurement drop-outs. In applications where the 
accelerometer may be the primary sensor, another sensor 10 
input may be used to periodically correct the measured value 
(e.g. by making distance measurements to the surroundings 
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IR (MWIR) LED sources and one unfiltered photodetector to 
detect the transmitted light as shown in FIG. 13. A MWIR 
LED 1305 may emit at 4.2 µm and another MWIR LED 1310 
may emit at 3.6 µm with the photodetector having sufficient 
sensitivity at both of these wavelengths. Again, a ratio of the 
photodetector's response to the transmitted 4.2 µm radiation 
to the response at 3.6 µm may be directly related to the gas 
mixture's C02 concentration. One benefit to this process for 
co2 detection over the aforementioned process described 
above is that the average power consumption may be reduced. 
For example, MWIR LEDs 1305 and 1310 may be briefly 
pulsed once during each measurement period as opposed to 
the heated filament source that may require a warm-up time 
lasting on the order of several seconds. Another benefit of this 
approach may be that the operating temperature range may be 
much wider than the above mentioned process. 
FIG. 14 shows a calculated 10 cm path transmission for 4.3 
µm C02 absorption band. The optical path length separating 
the LEDs from the photodetector may be 10 cm. For this path 
or by motion-tracking of objects in video images). Embodi-
ments of the invention may not use sensors external to con-
tainer 105, so correction of any temperature-dependent errors 15 
may be accomplished by sensing the accelerometer's tem-
perature and correcting the measured signal in software. On 
short time scales, velocity errors from noise sources and 
cross-coupling of acceleration components may be corrected 
with very-low frequency digital filtering. 20 length, the transmission at the 4.3 µm absorption band may 
vary linearly with C02 concentration as shown in FIG. 14. A 
50 ppm increase in C02 may result in a 1 % decrease in 
transmission that may require a 20 dB SNR to detect. 
A block diagram of a container movement detection sub-
system 1000 is shown in FIG. 10. Controller 1005 for the 
subsystem may be responsible for the timing of the accelera-
tion and temperature measurements as well as the calculation 
of the zero-g offset error correction and speed. FIG. 11 is a 25 
flowchart of a method 1100 for container movement detection 
that may be performed in software executed, for example, on 
processor 115 or, controller 125, or both. Method 1100 is an 
example and other processes may be used. 
A controller 1315 for human detection subsystem 1300 
may be responsible for timing both the LED pulse events and 
the digitization of the photodetector response signals as well 
as calculating the C02 concentration. A flowchart of a method 
1500 for operating human detection subsystem 1300 is shown 
in FIG. 15. Method 1500 may be implemented in software, 
Human Detection 
The detection of animal or human presence inside con-
tainer 105 may be achieved by monitoring C02 's concentra-
tion rate of change for container 105's interior atmosphere. 
Measurements of C02 concentration may be performed by 
system 100 every 10 minutes. If the C02 concentration 
increases such that over the course of two hours, for example, 
a threshold rate of change is exceeded, system 100 may ini-
tiate a human detection event alert. The rate of change thresh-
old may comprise, for example, 3.3%/min and 1.6% /min for 
20' and 40' containers respectively. 
30 for example, by controller 125 or processor 115, however, 
other methods may be used. In addition to measuring the 
photodetector response to the LED pulse events, the response 
to the background light level preceding the LED pulse events 
may be measured in order to remove the background signal 
35 value from both of the pulse event signal values during the 
calculation of the C02 absorption band transmission. 
Door Status Detection 
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, an optical 
sensor may be provided on a door within a door status sub-
40 system 1600 as shown in FIG. 16. Door status subsystem 
1600 may be used to detect door status on container 105. An 
optical approach may provide several advantages, including 
very low power consumption, high detection probability, and 
Consistent with embodiments of the present invention, 
processes used for measuring C02 concentration may be 
based upon a non-dispersive infrared (NDIR) process of gas 
detection. In the NDIR process, IR light from a broadband 
source, such as a heated filament, may be passed through a 45 
sample of the gas mixture to be analyzed, and detected with 
two separate photodetectors. Any co2 molecules within the 
gas mixture may absorb IR radiation having wavelengths 
between 4.18 and 4.33 µmas shown by the graph in FIG.12. 
The amount of radiation absorbed may be dependent on the 50 
concentration of C02 within the gas mixture and the optical 
path length of the light as it passes through the gas sample and 
arrives at either of the photodetectors. Distinct bandpass opti-
cal filters may be used with each photodetector to isolate 
different portions of the transmitted light's spectrum. The 55 
passband of one filter may be confined to the co2 absorption 
band mentioned above while the other filter's passband may 
be centered at 3 .6 µm. Because C02 may not absorb energy at 
this second wavelength, this photodetector' s response may be 
used as a witness value to gauge the ambient optical trans- 60 
mission of the gas mixture. A ratio of the two photodetectors' 
electrical responses may then be directly related to the C02 
concentration of the gas mixture and independent of the trans-
mission of the gas mixture. 
Instead of one broadband IR source and two filtered pho- 65 
todetectors, embodiments of the invention may include a 
human detection subsystem 1300 that may use two mid-wave 
resistance to tampering, for example. A door sensor may 
comprise two components that may be mounted at the door-
container interface. One component may be mounted on the 
container 105's door. This component may include a low 
divergence LED transmitter 1605 operating at a wavelength 
of 950 nm along with a driver circuit 1610 for the LED. A 
subsystem controller 1615, which may be connected to the 
transmitter by a cable that runs down the door, may generate 
a digital pulse whenever the transmitter is supposed to be 
activated. After receiving a pulse from controller 1615, driver 
circuit 1610 may supply a single current pulse to LED 1605 
that may be one microsecond in duration and 100 milliamps 
in amplitude. The duration and amplitude of this signal may 
be adjusted via small changes to the design of driver circuit 
1610. Because LED 1605/driver circuit 1610 combination 
may be capable of transmitting short pulses at relatively high 
frequencies, subsystem controller 1615 may generate ran-
domly varying pulse codes that may make it difficult for a 
false source to be substituted to allow the door to open without 
detection. 
A second component may be mounted on container 105's 
wall. The second component may include a low profile silicon 
photodiode 1620 that may be sensitive to LED 1605's wave-
length. When the door is in the closed position, the light from 
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along with the curved nature of the housings, may reduce the 
risk of cargo or loading equipment accidentally removing the 
sensors from the wall. 
As shown in FIG. 18, method 1800 may describe a process 
for operating the door status sensors. In order to prevent the 
introduction of a false transmitter, a randomly generated 
pulse code may be used for each interrogation of the sensor. 
This pulse code may comprise four bits during which the 
transmitter can either be on or off, resulting in sixteen differ-
the transmitter (i.e. first component) may be incident upon the 
detector (i.e. second component). As the door opens, the 
angle of incidence between the transmitter and the receiver 
may increase proportionally to the increase in angle between 
the door and the door interface. This change in angle may be 
exploited through using a light control film coating 1650 on 
the receiver as shown in more detail in FIG. 17. Light control 
film 1650 may comprise two thin plastic sheets that sandwich 
small vertical louvers between them. 
10 ent combinations. A start pulse may be used to indicate the 
beginning of a new interrogation in addition to the four bits of 
the pulse code. After the start pulse is transmitted, the receiver 
output may be amplified and converted into a digital value by 
anA/D converter. If this output does not exceed the minimum 
Light control film 1650 may cause the output of photo-
diode 1620 to become strongly dependent upon the angle of 
incidence between the transmitter and the receiver. As a 
result, the receiver output may decrease rapidly as the door is 
opened and the angle between the transmitter and receiver 
increases. This change in receiver output can be measured 
electronically and compared to a stored threshold value to 
determine whether the door has been opened. The threshold 
value, for example, may be based on a 44 mm opening that 
may be allowed due to container racking. A 44 mm opening 
may translate into a two degree angle between the door and 
the container interface. A two degree change in angle of 
incidence may result in a change in receiver output of 
approximately 5%, which may be in the detectable range for 
this sensor. The use of a threshold value may allow for simple 25 
adjustments if operational experience indicates that 44 mm is 
not an accurate deviation due to container racking. Moreover, 
the angular dependence may occur only in one direction, 
which may reduce the alignment requirements for the 
installed sensors. In order to compare the receiver output with 30 
the threshold value, it may be first amplified by an amplifier 
1625 and then converted into a digital signal using an analog 
to digital converter 1630. AID converter 1630 may be con-
nected directly to controller 1615 that may perform the pro-
cessing. 
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, in order to 
minimize the effects of container racking, the sensors may be 
installed at the same location as the door hinges since the 
hinge may limit movement of the door. Multiple sensors (e.g. 
three sensors 1655, 1660, and 1665) may be used on each 
door in order to provide redundancy in the event of accidental 
or malicious failures. Although some containers may use 
more than three hinges, additional sensors may not provide 
sufficient improvements in probability of detection or false 
alarm to justify the additional cost. The cables that connect 
each sensor component to subsystem controller 1615 may 
carry both power and digital signals to and from sensors 1655, 
1660, and 1665. These cables may be part of a main wiring 
harness in order to minimize installation complexity. 
Armored cable may be used to reduce the risk of either acci-
dental or intentional damage to the cable. Routing the cable in 
container 105's corrugations where possible may also limit 
the impact of the cable on the container. 
15 threshold value, then the door status may be changed to open 
and transmitted to controller 125. If it is above the minimum, 
then the remainder of the pulse code is transmitted. Each bit 
may be compared to the threshold level to determine whether 
the transmitted bit was on or off. After the pulse code has been 
20 completely transmitted, the received pulse code may be com-
pared to the expected pulse code in subsystem controller 1615 
to determine whether the correct code has been received. If 
the correct code has not been received, then a tampering alarm 
may be generated to indicate that an attempt to defeat the 
system has occurred. A door open status may only be declared 
if all three sensors on a given door indicate that it is open. This 
may provide further immunity to container racking errors. 
These pulse codes may be generated in a pseudorandom 
manner so that the receiver knows what code to expect from 
the transmitter at any particular moment. This may eliminate 
the need to connect a cable between the transmitter located on 
the door and the receiver located on the container wall. 
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, a pseudo-
random number generation (PRNG) modulation scheme may 
35 be used to eliminate the need for a cable connecting the 
transmitter and receiver component and also to prevent tam-
pering via the introduction of an external LED source. PRNG 
may utilize a pseudo-random sequence that may be seeded at 
the factory and known only to the transmitter and receiver and 
40 may allow the receiver to know what code is expected at a 
particular time without a wired connection to the transmitter. 
The transmitter unit may generate a large-length pseudo-
random bit sequence using a linear feedback shift register that 
may include randomly interleaved re-sync events. These re-
45 sync events may appear to be a continuation of the random bit 
stream normally generated, but may be recognized by the 
receiver and may permit the receiver to synchronize with the 
transmitted bit stream without needing to exhaustively test all 
possible bit sequences. The average rate of re-sync events 
50 may be controlled by design. 
Sensor Fusion 
In order to minimize installation complexity, the two sen-
sor components may be manufactured as one physical part 55 
with a perforated plastic material separating the two sensors. 
Once the sensors have been secured to the container, the 
plastic holding the two parts together may be cut and 
removed, allowing the door to move freely. This construction 
may ensure that the sensors are properly aligned during 60 
installation. Packaging for the sensor may be rugged but 
unobtrusive in order to avoid impacting container operations. 
Both components may be packaged in small metal housings 
that are sturdy enough to withstand impacts from cargo shift-
ing in the container. The LED diameter may be 5 mm and the 65 
thickness of the photodiode may be less than 1 mm. This may 
allow each component to be low profile. This construction, 
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, ultrasonic 
sensor data may be fused at multiple (e.g. three) levels as 
shown in FIG. 19 and FIG. 20. First, at the sensor level, active 
sensors may be fused with temperature sensor data to obtain 
an active sensor result for each container surface (e.g. walls, 
ceiling, doors). Similarly, passive sensor data may be fused to 
obtain a passive result for each surface. Second, at the surface 
level, active and passive results may be fused. Finally, at the 
container level, active and passive ultrasonic sensor data from 
each surface may be fused with EMTL sensor results along 
with humidity and motion sensor information to obtain an 
overall container breach result. This fusion hierarchy is 
shown in FIG. 19 and FIG. 20 below where the circle with an 
"X" indicates fusion. The actual fusion algorithms may use 
simple voting strategies or complex neural networks for 
example. 
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Tampering Resistance 
18 
ware and/or in software (including firmware, resident soft-
ware, micro-code, etc.). In other words, embodiments of the 
present invention may take the form of a computer program 
product on a computer-usable or computer-readable storage 
medium having computer-usable or computer-readable pro-
gram code embodied in the medium for use by or in connec-
tion with an instruction execution system. A computer-usable 
or computer-readable medium may be any medium that can 
contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport the pro-
Consistent with embodiments of the invention, tamper 
resistant mechanisms may be incorporated into each of the 
sensor subsystems. For example, the door status sensor may 
use a randomly generated optical code to prevent the intro-
duction of a false transmitter to simulate the door closed 
signal. Other subsystems, including the ultrasonic and EMTL 
sensors, may use time-varying signals that may be difficult to 
spoof. Furthermore, cabling may contain an internal continu-
ity loop that can be interrogated to ensure that the cable is still 
connected properly. This may provide an early alert if an 
attempt to cut a cable occurs. 
10 gram for use by or in connection with the instruction execu-
tion system, apparatus, or device. 
The computer-usable or computer-readable medium may 
be, for example but not limited to, an electronic, magnetic, 
optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, 
System batteries may be installed in controller 125 to pre-
vent removal by unauthorized persons. Power to the system 
may be activated via an irreversible switch mechanism that 
may prevent the system from being turned off without access-
ing a secure enclosure housing controller 125. Moreover, all 
circuit boards may either be conformal coated or embedded in 
potting compound for protection from environmental condi-
tions (e.g. intentional or otherwise) and resistance to exploi-
tation and tampering. 
15 apparatus, device, or propagation medium. More specific 
computer-readable medium examples (a non-exhaustive list), 
the computer-readable medium may include the following: an 
electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable 
computer diskette, a random access memory (RAM), a read-
Controller 125 may be environmentally sealed using a 
bladder process to prevent problems due to gases or moisture. 
Furthermore, controller 125 may be mounted to container 105 
using a base plate fabricated from ballistic aluminum or a 
similar material that may be difficult to breach without spe-
cialized tools. The integrity of controller 125' s mounting may 
20 only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only 
memory (EPROM or Flash memory), an optical fiber, and a 
portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM). Note 
that the computer-usable or computer-readable medium 
could even be paper or another suitable medium upon which 
be monitored using a sensor similar to those used to detect 
door status and any breach attempts may be reported as alerts. 
25 the program is printed, as the program can be electronically 
captured, via, for instance, optical scanning of the paper or 
other medium, then compiled, interpreted, or otherwise pro-
cessed in a suitable manner, if necessary, and then stored in a 
computer memory. 
Embodiments of the present invention, for example, are 
described above with reference to block diagrams and/or 
operational illustrations of methods, systems, and computer 
program products according to embodiments of the inven-
tion. The functions/acts noted in the blocks may occur out of 
35 the order as show in any flowchart. For example, two blocks 
shown in succession may in fact be executed substantially 
concurrently or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the 
reverse order, depending upon the functionality/acts 
involved. 
Generally, consistent with embodiments of the invention, 30 
program modules may include routines, programs, compo-
nents, data structures, and other types of structures that may 
perform particular tasks or that may implement particular 
abstract data types. Moreover, embodiments of the invention 
may be practiced with other computer system configurations, 
including hand-held devices, multiprocessor systems, micro-
processor-based or programmable consumer electronics, 
minicomputers, mainframe computers, and the like. Embodi-
ments of the invention may also be practiced in distributed 
computing environments where tasks are performed by 40 
remote processing devices that are linked through a commu-
nications network. In a distributed computing environment, 
program modules may be located in both local and remote 
memory storage devices. 
Furthermore, embodiments of the invention may be prac- 45 
ticed in an electrical circuit comprising discrete electronic 
elements, packaged or integrated electronic chips containing 
logic gates, a circuit utilizing a microprocessor, or on a single 
chip containing electronic elements or microprocessors. 
Embodiments of the invention may also be practiced using 50 
other technologies capable of performing logical operations 
such as, for example, AND, OR, and NOT, including but not 
limited to mechanical, optical, fluidic, and quantum technolo-
gies. In addition, embodiments of the invention may be prac-
ticed within a general purpose computer or in any other cir- 55 
cuits or systems. 
Embodiments of the invention, for example, may be imple-
mented as a computer process (method), a computing system, 
or as an article of manufacture, such as a computer program 
product or computer readable media. The computer program 60 
product may be a computer storage media readable by a 
computer system and encoding a computer program of 
instructions for executing a computer process. The computer 
program product may also be a propagated signal on a carrier 
readable by a computing system and encoding a computer 65 
program of instructions for executing a computer process. 
Accordingly, the present invention may be embodied in hard-
While certain embodiments of the invention have been 
described, other embodiments may exist. Furthermore, 
although embodiments of the present invention have been 
described as being associated with data stored in memory and 
other storage mediums, data can also be stored on or read 
from other types of computer-readable media, such as sec-
ondary storage devices, like hard disks, floppy disks, or a 
CD-ROM, a carrier wave from the Internet, or other forms of 
RAM or ROM. Further, the disclosed methods' stages may be 
modified in any manner, including by reordering stages and/ 
or inserting or deleting stages, without departing from the 
invention. 
While the specification includes examples, the invention's 
scope is indicated by the following claims. Furthermore, 
while the specification has been described in language spe-
cific to structural features and/or methodological acts, the 
claims are not limited to the features or acts described above. 
Rather, the specific features and acts described above are 
disclosed as example for embodiments of the invention. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method for determining a structure intrusion, the 
method comprising: 
receiving, in a passive detection mode, a signal corre-
sponding to an elastic wave propagating in the structure; 
analyzing, by a processing device, the received signal; 
determining that at least one aspect of the received signal 
crosses a predetermined threshold; and 
US 8,406,082 B2 
19 
switching from the passive detection mode to an active 
detection mode in response to a determination that at 
least one aspect of the received signal crosses the pre-
determined threshold, wherein switching from the pas-
sive detection mode to the active detection mode com-
prises switching from independent sensor operation to 
transmit-receive paired sensor operation. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving the signal 
corresponding to the wave propagating in the structure com-
prises receiving the signal that interacted with at least one of 10 
the following: boundaries of the structure and variations of 
the structure. 
3. The method of claim 1, wherein receiving the signal 
corresponding to the wave comprises receiving the signal 15 
corresponding to the wave comprising one of the following: 
the wave being an elastic wave in an acoustic frequency range 
and the wave being an elastic wave in an ultrasonic frequency 
range. 
4. The method of claim 1, wherein analyzing the received 20 
signal comprises analyzing the received signal in a frequency 
domain. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein analyzing the received 
signal comprises analyzing the received signal in a frequency 
domain in terms of ratios of energies in different frequency 25 
bands. 
20 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein analyzing the received 
signal comprises analyzing the received signal in a time 
domain. 
7. The method of claim 1, wherein analyzing the received 
signal comprises analyzing the received signal in a time-
frequency domain. 
8. A method for determining a structure intrusion, the 
method comprising: 
receiving, at a first state independent sensor operation 
mode, a first signal corresponding to a first wave propa-
gating in the structure; 
analyzing the received first signal; 
determining that at least one aspect of the received first 
signal crosses a predetermined threshold; 
switching, in response to a determination that the at least 
one aspect of the received first signal crosses the prede-
termined threshold, to a transmit-receive paired sensor 
operation mode second state; 
receiving, at the paired sensor operation mode second state, 
a second signal corresponding to a second wave propa-
gating in the structure; 
analyzing, by a processor device, the received second sig-
nal; and 
determining, in response to analyzing the received second 
signal, that a breach has occurred in the structure. 
* * * * * 
